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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between a corporation’s tax rate and a
number of different variables. The variables chosen were assets, sales, property,
plant, and equipment (PPE), inventory, research and development (R&D), and
return on assets (ROA). The model incorporates each of these variables to find a
correlation to corporate tax rates. These specific variables were chosen to
represent firm size (assets at book value), financial leverage, capital structure (PPE
to assets), and inventory investment (inventory to assets). The other two variables,
R&D (R&D to net sales), and profitability (ROA) were chosen because of their
direct value. The results from the research highlight a few variables with strong
correlations to tax rates, while others remained neutral.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this study was provided by the economic and political subject of
corporate tax inversion. Due to high corporate tax rates in America, many companies have
decided to go “international.” Once they declare themselves a foreign company, they are
responsible for that nation’s tax rate, not America’s. The reason “international” appears in
quotation marks is because many of these companies meet minimal requirements to declare
themselves foreign. Depending on how you look at it, you could either call these corporations
smart, or unethical. On one hand, they are experiencing enormous profit because they pay less
tax. On the other hand, however, the American government loses billions of dollars each year
because of these practices.
The aim of this study eventually became an examination of what could make tax rates so
harsh. Why are some companies subject to more scrutiny than others? Which variables are most
closely correlated with a high tax rate, and why? These are some of the questions that stem from
the overarching topic of corporate tax inversion.
Efforts have been made by the American government to combat tax inversion. The
government loses billions of dollars each year because of corporations that invert their taxes to
low-tax “safe-havens.” The newest actions by the American government have been aimed at
making inversions harder to accomplish and less profitable. The former will reduce inversions,
while the latter will deter companies from desiring to “relocate.” At the head of these efforts lies
the United States’ Treasury Department. The Treasury is constantly taking action under different
tax codes. In recent history, it seems as if corporations are finding more loopholes after each set
of codes that is reformed. The advantage that the Treasury experiences is that their tax changes
take effect immediately. Any deal that doesn’t close by the end of the day is subject to the
reform made. Most other government agencies do not experience this efficiency.
2.0 CORPORATE TAX TRENDS
There is an estimation of at least 30 new inversions to take place by the end of 2015.
Treasury officials hope that new tax rules will cause companies to re-examine their costs and
benefits. Any inversion deal stopped is money saved for the United States government.

Burger King, inc. is a perfect example of how it all works. After months of trying to buy out
smaller foreign restaurants, the corporation kept getting blocked by the Treasury’s reform laws
on tax. Burger King, inc. realized they would have to spend more money to make more money.
The result? An $11 billion dollar deal to take over Tim Horton’s, inc. In December of 2014, the
merger went through and Burger King Worldwide, inc., became a Canadian corporation
operating under Restaurant Brands International.
The attempted Chiquita Brands International inc. (Charlotte, NC), and Fyffes PLC merger is
a great example of the United States’ Treasury Department blocking tax inversion. A merger
between the two companies would have created the world’s largest banana seller. The
motivation to merge was brought about by potential tax savings. The safe-haven was to be in
Ireland (home of Fyffes), which sees much lower tax rates than the United States. However, it
was ruined by changes in U.S. tax rules.

Many pharmaceutical companies have tried to invert their taxes. New Treasury Department
tax rules caused AbbVie inc. to terminate its $54 billion inversion deal with Shire PLC (Ireland).

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
There were many different facets of corporate tax inversion and tax rate analysis that
stemmed from this study. Inversion is a growing trend among U.S. business culture so there
were papers very relevant to this topic. The nation is losing so much money as a whole, while
individuals profit.

Gupta and Newberry (1997) provided the foundation for tax rate analysis. Using microlevel data, they were able to produce a model that showed tax rates to be inconsistent with firm
size. This was surprising because firm size is what many economists would automatically
correlate with tax rates. Instead, they found that most influence is found when examining a
firm’s capital structure, asset mix, and performance. These variables, which include measurable
such as research and development, inventory, and property, plant, and equipment were shown to
have a very close relationship to a corporation’s tax rate.
Graham (1996) had a similar study that focused on the best measures of corporate tax
rates. His aim was more on the financial analysis of capital costs, financing policy, corporate
hedging, and corporate reorganizations. Graham used a marginal tax rate to represent firms and
further the financial analysis. Research by Scholes and Wolfson (1992) was used to expand the
understanding of the marginal tax rate and its “ramifications.” Results of the study showed that
the marginal tax rate is a great tool, except for its incredibly difficult-to-calculate code.
Evidence suggested that a proxy for marginal tax rate would be recommended. Thus, Gupta and
Newberry (1997) would go on to use the effective tax rate, an easier variable to calculate.
Devereux (2007) took tax rates and put them into real-life use. In his study, he examined
the international competition over corporate taxes. He described how this competition can cause
companies to declare foreign ownership or merge to avoid higher taxes. This makes sense in a
country such as the United States with an extremely large corporate tax rate. As Devereux
describes it, policy makers are concerned about a “race to the bottom,” in terms of the tax rates.
The lower tax rate will likely receive the winning bid for a multi-billion dollar company.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 DATA

The data employed for this research came from the FactSet database. Panel data from
2004 to 2013 was compiled to run a regression analysis, as well as a logarithmic regression,
fixed effects regression, descriptive statistics, and a correlation analysis.

4.2 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
TR = β0 + β1SIZE +β2LEV + β3CAPINT + β4INVINT + β5RDINT +β6ROA
With this adapted model, the dependent variable is the tax rate of the firm. The
dependent variables were firm size (SIZE), sales (LEV), asset mix (CAPINT, INVINT, and
RDINT), and firm performance (ROA).
Firm size (SIZE) was represented by each firm’s total assets. This was chosen to
measure the reach each firm has. Generally, the more assets each firm owns, the larger their
company is. Other options such as employee intensity may not accurately measure the size of
the firm because this is not necessarily associated with the wealth or influence a firm may hold.
The financial leverage of each company (LEV) was calculated dividing sales by total assets. The
sales a company brings in accurately depicts their financial strength. A company with a higher
sales to assets ratio generally generates more profit than a lesser company. Capital intensity was
found by using each company’s value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. With this
variable, we were able to conclude how much capital each firm had invested. Another piece of
the asset-mix was inventory intensity. This was found by measuring inventory to total assets.
The intensity of a firm’s research and development was measured by the research and
development expenditure to net sales.
5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As you can see in Tables 1.0 and 1.1 below, the regression analysis returned encouraging
results. Four of the six independent variables returned P-values that could be used for analysis.

The only two which were unable to produce a correlation were sales and ROA. Assets, PPE,
Inventory, and R&D all returned usable P-values with varying correlation coefficients.
Assets was by far the most interesting result, although the correlation was not the
strongest. The P-value was a firm 0.000957, with a weak -4.6E-05 for the correlation
coefficient. In this particular case, however, the negative sign is much more interesting that the
depth of the coefficient. There aren’t many economic analysts that would predict an increase in
assets to correlate with smaller taxes. One would assume the opposite. However, American
corporations are operating in unequal capacities. Speaking to business ethics, the more assets
you hold, the more taxes you should be able to pay. In America, however: the more assets you
hold, the more able you are to find political and economic loopholes to generate more profit.
This would be an extremely interesting ethical dilemma to research. Although it was outside the
scope of this particular study, the topic fits in neatly with corporate tax inversion for future
empirical analysis.
A positive correlation came through property, plant, and equipment, or PPE. The P-value
was 0.003415. The correlation coefficient was positive, at 0.000184. This result is much
expected. The property, plant, and equipment a firm holds is continuously taxed by the
government. The more PPE they use, the higher their tax rate would be. This is why many firms
choose to outsource their labor and infrastructure to foreign nations that have lower costs.
Another positive correlation was found in inventory intensity. A weaker P-value at
0.080519 produced a correlation coefficient of 0.000976. So, although the correlation was not as
strong as many economists would anticipate, it was indeed indicative of a higher tax rate. The
more inventory a firm holds, the more they will be taxed on those products and the more space
they will need to hold their inventory.
A separate regression was run using the logarithm of the tax rate, as suggested by Gupta
and Newberry (1997). With this regression, an additional correlation appeared in the form of
research and development. At a 0.031193 P-value and a correlation coefficient of -2.1E-05,
R&D matched criteria. Although the coefficient is rather weak, the P-value is strong.

Table 1.0 Random Effects Regression

Coefficientsandard Err
Intercept 30.78594 2.588195
Assets
-4.6E-05 1.37E-05
Sales
-4E-05 3.09E-05
Ppe
0.000184 6.17E-05
Inventory 0.000976 0.000555
R&D
-0.00065 0.000709
ROA
-0.11229 0.144102

t Stat
11.89476
-3.36825
-1.30089
2.974161
1.759338
-0.92053
-0.77926

P-value
1.62E-23
0.000957
0.195253
0.003415
0.080519
0.358743
0.437029

Table 1.1 LogTax Regression

Coefficientsandard Erro t Stat
Intercept 1.484906 0.034823 42.64148
Assets
-2.2E-07 1.85E-07 -1.21292
Sales
7.69E-08 4.15E-07 0.18515
PPE
1.03E-06 8.31E-07 1.237063
Inventory 5.6E-06 7.46E-06 0.749611
R&D
-2.1E-05 9.54E-06 -2.17464
ROA
-0.00313 0.001939 -1.61573

P-value
8.06E-87
0.227031
0.853357
0.217959
0.45464
0.031193
0.108213

6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
A lot is being done to combat corporate tax inversion. Much of the weight lies on the
shoulders of the U.S. Treasury department, since our President’s hands are tied by battles in
Congress. The Treasury is able to immediately put new tax codes into place, so they are the
government’s best chance at deterring inversions. Much of the support for inversions and “free
markets” comes from wealthy representatives of the right wing who do what they can to make
sure laws aren’t passed through congress that hinder their supporters best interests. Many of
these wealthy CEO’s could be the reason those politicians were elected to represent in the first
place, so now they return the favor by ensuring profit for their supporters. What President
Obama has been trying to do for the last several years is enact a plan that would require a
minimum business percentage (say 51%) to take place on foreign soil. This should be the only
way those corporations are allowed to pay tax rates under those foreign nations. This policy
seems like a fair and ethical one, but it has received much opposition since discussions began.

The data compiled was significant enough to draw a few conclusions from in terms of
variable correlation. The only unexpected correlation came from assets, representing the size of
the firm. An explanation offered would infer that bigger corporations are able to swing political
power in their favor, resulting in lower tax rates. This is yet another unethical corporate tax
dilemma that America faces. The United States is not operating under a free market economy,
but rather the delusion of one. Large corporations own it.

Appendix A: Variable Description and Data Source

Variable
Assets
Sales
PPE
Inventory
R&D
ROA

Description
Size of the company
Firm’s Power
Equipment
Invested assets
Future investment
Profitability relative to assets

Data Source
FactSet
FactSet
FactSet
FactSet
FactSet
FactSet

Appendix B: Variable Expected Sign
Variable
Assets
Sales
PPE
Inventory
R&D
ROA

Expected Sign

+
+
+
+
+
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